First, to be effective, threats must be credible. I imagine that the Iranians must view our threats in something like the scale I have just set out. If they have, I imagine that they will have concluded that the United States government would have to be mad to attack Iran when the costs of doing so are so evident and so large. (...)
Second, it does not seem clear to me what the Iranians could do, even if they wished to do so, to satisfy the United States’ demands unless Iran were occupied. Absent a large and intrusive American presence, how could an Iranian government prove that it does not have or at least seek nuclear weapons? Proving a negative has always been logically impossible and any attempt to do so would certainly be politically unsatisfactory to America and probably politically impossible for Iran. (...)
Third, having received a credible threat to destroy their country, the Iranians almost certainly would seek as rapidly as secretly possible to acquire the only sure means to deter such an attack, possession of a nuclear weapon.
fredag den 21. marts 2008
Polk, om USA og Iran: Fordi Iran ikke kan bevise at det ikke prøver at få atomvåben - så det tilfredsstiller USA - bliver det nødt til at skaffe sig atomvåben for at forsvare sig mod USAs trusler om at angribe, hvis det prøver at skaffe sig atomvåben.