From the information in the Pentagon Papers, critics of the war concluded that four administrations - Truman's, Eisenhower's, Kennedy's and Johnson's - had exaggerated the American political, military, and psychological stakes in Indochina in order to get congressional and public concurrence with their policies. The critics blamed the Johnson administration for deceiving Congress in getting the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution through Congress by manipulation of the Gulf of Tonkin Incidents, and then for misleading Congress and the country as to progress of the war in Vietnam. More broadly, the critics held that since 1945 the habit of executive secrecy and manipulation of public and congressional opinion in regard to Southeast Asia on grounds of national security had become a dangerous influence on the democratic traditions of the United States and that not national security but the arrogance of those in power was at the root of the problem. They claimed that the consequence of such malfeasance was a misguided foreign policy that had cost thousands of American lives for the defense of doubtful assumptions regarding communist expansion, as well as the prolongation of an "unwinnable war" in Southeast Asia.Jeg aner et mønster.
Der var den: The Phoenix Program. Problemet med en snigmordskampagne er - udover jura og moral - at man skal have meget gode efterretninger fra yderst troværdige kilder for at ramme rigtigt. Som regel ender man bare med at myrde folk der har irriteret den lokale guvernør.
Ak ja. CO-IN er stadig som at spise suppe med kniv.